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INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE1 
Amici are scholars with the Information Society 
Project at Yale Law School (ISP),2 an intellectual 
center addressing the implications of new 
information technologies for law and society:  Wendy 
Seltzer, a Senior Fellow at the ISP, writes on law 
and technology of free expression and user 
innovation, including digital copyright, software 
patent, and information privacy. She founded and 
leads the Chilling Effects Clearinghouse, exploring 
legal threats to online expression at 
https://www.chillingeffects.org/; Margot Kaminski, 
Research Scholar in Law and Executive Director of 
the ISP, writes on privacy, information politics and 
First Amendment issues; Priscilla Smith, Senior 
Fellow of the ISP, Jennifer Keighley, Resident 
Fellow of the ISP, and Genevieve Scott, Visiting 
Fellow of the ISP, research and write on reproductive 
rights, with a particular focus on information policy 
and new technologies.   
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
As this Court has explained clearly, the grant of a 
patent is a narrowly tailored exception to our free 
market system, a “carefully crafted bargain” 

1 No counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part, 
and no person or entity other than amici and their counsel 
made any monetary contribution toward the preparation or 
submission of this brief. Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 37.3, 
an email indicating the Respondent’s consent to the filing of 
this amicus brief has been submitted to the Clerk. The 
Petitioners filed a consent to the filing of amicus curiae briefs 
with the Court on December 15, 2011. 
2 The Fellows participate in this case in their personal capacity; 
titles are used only for purposes of identification.   
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designed to strike a balance between the avoidance 
of monopolies that stifle competition and the need to 
encourage innovation.  Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder 
Craft Boats, 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989).   
In this brief, Amici argue, first, that the Court 
should grant the Petition because Myriad’s monopoly 
on the information contained in Breast Cancer 
Susceptibility Genes 1 and 2 (hereafter “BRCA 1/2”)3 
undermines the careful balance struck by the patent 
rules.  The evidence establishes that by limiting 
research on the BRCA 1/2 genes, and in the field of 
genetics more broadly, Myriad’s patents stifle 
innovation and prevent information about natural 
phenomenon from being used in research to improve 
diagnosis and treatment of deadly diseases.4   
Second, Amici argue that this Court should grant 
the Petition to closely examine these patents, which 
harm public health and undermine the exercise of 
fundamental rights.  Myriad’s patents create 
significant health risks for women, limit access to 
life-saving information about naturally occurring 
aspects of their own genomes, thereby undermining 

3 BRCA1 and BRCA2 “belong to a class of genes known as 
tumor suppressors. Mutation of these genes has been linked to 
hereditary breast and ovarian cancer.”  National Cancer 
Institute Fact Sheets, BRCA1 and BRCA2: Cancer Risk and 
Genetic Testing, (Mar. 29, 2009), http://www.cancer.gov/ 
cancertopics/factsheet/Risk/BRCA . 
4 Dep’t of Health & Human Serv., Sec’y’s Advisory Comm. on 
Genetics, Health, and Soc’y, Gene Patents and Licensing 
Practices and Their Impact on Patient Access to Genetic Tests 
(April 2010), available at http://oba.od.nih.gov/oba/sacghs/ 
reports/SACGHS_patents_report_2010.pdf (hereinafter SACGHS 
report) (hereinafter SACGHS report). 
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their liberty rights to decisional autonomy, bodily 
integrity, and procreation. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Petition Should Be Granted Because 
The BRCA 1/2 Patents Stifle Innovation 
And Create a “Double Monopoly,” 
Thereby Undermining The Goals Of The 
Patent System In Conflict With This 
Court’s Precedent.  
Because “imitation and refinement through 
imitation are both necessary to invention itself and 
the very lifeblood of a competitive economy,” Bonito 
Boats, 489 U.S. at 150,  the central concern of patent 
law is “the difficult business ‘of drawing a line 
between those things which are worth to the public 
the embarrassment of an exclusive patent and those 
which are not.’”  Id. at 148 (quoting 13 Writings of 
Thomas Jefferson 335 (Memorial ed. 1904)).  The 
“stringent requirements for patent protection seek to 
ensure that ideas in the public domain remain there 
for the use of the public.” Id. at 150.  This is 
especially true for “[p]henomena of nature, though 
just discovered, . . . as they are the basic tools of 
scientific and technological work.”  Gottschalk v. 
Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972).   
To protect their public domain status and 
encourage scientific progress, this Court recognizes 
that “discoveries” of laws of nature or physical 
phenomena, including discoveries of an existing 
scientific relationship, are excluded from the 
category of patentable subject matter under Title 35 
4 
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U.S.C. §101. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 
309 (1980).  As this Court explained:  
The underlying notion is that a scientific 
principle, . . . reveals a relationship that 
has always existed. . . . “Such ‘mere’ 
recognition of a theretofore existing 
phenomenon or relationship carries with it 
no rights to exclude others from its 
enjoyment. . . . There is a very compelling 
reason for this rule. The reason is founded 
upon the proposition that in granting 
patent rights, the public must not be 
deprived of any rights that it theretofore 
freely enjoyed.”   
Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 593 n.15 (1978) 
(quoting P. Rosenberg, Patent Law Fundamentals, § 
4, p. 13 (1975)).  Granting patents on the recognition 
of existing relationships in nature, such as the 
nucleotide sequence on a strand of DNA, prevents 
the use of these natural phenomenon to conduct 
additional research, “discover” other natural 
relationships, and develop innovations in disease 
treatments.   
The BRCA 1/2 patents have imbalanced the 
patent system.5  The patents are on basic scientific 
knowledge, “the very instructions inside each of our 
cells that determine what proteins are produced.”6  
Because “knowledge itself is what is patented in a 

5 Stiglitz Decl. ¶¶ 15, 19. 25, Jan. 19, 2010. 
6 Id. at ¶ 25. 
5 
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gene patent,” the tradeoff that normally occurs in the 
patent system is undermined.7  
Ordinarily, patents leave room for competitors to 
“invent around.”8  For example, with chemical 
compounds, a patent does not prevent competitors 
from manufacturing a different chemical compound 
with a functionally similar result.  Because the 
human genome contains a finite number of genes, it 
is impossible to invent around a genetic patent to 
create an equivalent, but non-infringing invention.9  
“One cannot invent around the sequence if it is 
patented because each gene and each gene sequence 
is unique in its kind.”10  Moreover, researching and 
acquiring a patent on human genetic information 
does not impose the same financial costs as the 
development of pharmaceutical patents.11  
Pharmaceutical drug development costs are 
increased due to “salaries for research and 
development scientists, the great expense of animal 
research and human clinical trials, and the cost of 

7 Id. at. ¶¶ 10, 12. 25. 
8 See WMS Gaming, Inc. v. Int’l Game Tech., 184 F.3d 1339, 
1355 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
9 Andrew S. Robertson, The Role of Genetic Patents in Genetic 
Test Innovation and Access, 9 Nw. J. Tech. & Intell. Prop. 377 
at *10 (2011) (citing Stephen A. Merrill & Anne-Marie Mazza 
eds., Reaping the Benefits of Genomic and Proteomic Research: 
Intellectual Property Rights, Innovation, and Public Health 
Nat’l Research Council, Nat’l Acad. Of Scis. (2006)). 
10 Gert Matthijs, The European Opposition Against the BRCA 
Gene Patents, 5 Familial Cancer 95 (2006). 
11 Lori B. Andrews, The Gene Patent Dilemma: Balancing 
Commercial Incentives with Health Needs, 2 Hous. J. Health L. 
& Pol'y 65, 77 (2002); see also SACGHS report. at 34 (“The cost 
of developing these laboratory-developed tests appear to be 
relatively modest.”); Cho Decl. ¶¶ 17, 23, Aug. 17, 2009. 
6 
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obtaining FDA approval.”12 In contrast, technological 
developments in the area of genomic screening can 
be accomplished in much less time, using known 
techniques, and is not regulated by the FDA.13   
By securing a patent on the genetic information 
in the BRCA 1/2 genes, Myriad has left no 
alternative for genetic testing on those genes, 
creating a powerful “double monopoly.”14 “When the 
uniqueness of the genetic code is combined with the 
exclusive rights of patents, a truly unbreakable 
monopolistic right is generated.”15  In such an 
environment, patentees are dissuaded from 
performing additional research, charging reasonable 
prices, or cross-licensing technology.16  “Profit 
maximizing behavior and progress-maximizing 
behavior” are “at odds.”17   
This is the precisely the environment that has 
allowed Myriad to abuse its monopoly power by 
inflating prices, delaying researchers’ access to 
information, and inhibiting the progress of genetic 
testing.  The BRCA 1/2 patents place restrictions on 

12 Id. 
13 Id. 
14 Gert Matthijs, The European Opposition, supra, at 5. 
15 Gert Matthijs & Dicky Halley, European-Wide Opposition 
Against The Breast Cancer Gene Patents, 10 Eur. J. of Hum. 
Genetics 783 (2002). 
16 Maureen E. Boyle, Leaving Room For Research: The 
Historical Treatment of The Common Law Research Exemption 
in Congress and the Courts, and Its Relationship To Biotech 
Law And Policy, 12 Yale J. L. & Tech. 269 (2010) (citing 
Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter 
Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 
SCIENCE 6918 (1998)). 
17 Id. 
7 
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facts of nature that distort the efficient allocation of 
resources; the tremendous rewards granted to 
Myriad do not correspond to the social returns.18   
II. Myriad’s Monopoly In Facts of Nature 
Was Unnecessary To Incentivize 
Research On The BRCA 1/2 Genes, and 
Inhibits Innovation. 
 
The evidence in this case establishes that the 
promise of a patent grant did not act as the incentive 
for the original research on the BRCA genes; and 
rather than encouraging innovation and scientific 
progress, the BRCA 1/2 gene patents stifle advances 
in medical testing.  As a result, the patents prevent 
research into relationships between the BRCA genes 
and other cancers as well as other genetic diseases, 
delaying the discovery of life-saving information 
about breast cancer, ovarian cancer, and other 
diseases. 
These limitations on innovation are not a normal 
consequence of the patent system; they are a 
consequence of the overextension of the patent 
system to cover the discovery of scientific fact, 
creating a monopoly on the “basic tools” of scientific 
research.  Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 67.  Given the 
fundamental nature of the information contained in 
a human gene, it is unsurprising that the BRCA 1/2 
patents on human genes have retarded innovation 
and stifled competition.  
      
 

18 Stiglitz Decl. ¶¶ 19, 26, Jan. 19, 2010. 
8 
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A. The Monopoly Granted To Myriad Was 
Unnecessary To Incentivize the 
Identification of the BRCA 1/2 Genes. 
In its report entitled Gene Patents and Licensing 
Practices and Their Impact on Patient Access to 
Genetic Tests (hereinafter “SACGHS report”), the 
Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Genetics, Health 
and Society conclude that patents are not necessary 
to ensure that genetic tests come to market,19 finding 
significant evidence that most gene discoveries are in 
fact not patent-driven.20  The “inventor class” in 
genetics and biotechnology are academic and 
industry researchers whose primary motivations are 
“the desire to advance understanding, help their 
patients by developing treatments for disease, 
advance their careers, and enhance their 
reputations.”21  Gene patents serve only to prevent 
alternative, and potentially more accurate, tests 
from being shared in the market.22   
Moreover, advances in genetics have been and 
continue to be significantly funded by the publically 
financed human genome project and U.S. federal 
funds.23   According to the SACGHS report, although 

19 SACGHS report at 26.  
20 Id. at 2.  
21 Id. at 21-22.  
22 Id. at 34. 
23 Id. at 26; Ledbetter Decl. ¶ 13 , Aug. 20, 2009; See also Cho 
Decl.¶ 22, Aug. 17, 2009 (a study of gene patents in the US on 
genetic diagnosis showed that 67% were for discoveries funded 
by the U.S. government) (citing Schissel, A., Merz, JF, Cho, 
MK., Survey Confirms Fears About Licensing of Genetic Tests, 
402 Nature 118 (1999); see also Cho Decl. ¶¶ 17, 23, Aug. 17, 
2009 (“the majority of patented gene discoveries were supported 
by the federal government.”)).   
9 
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a patent or exclusive license may at times stimulate 
its holder to develop a genetic test, SACGHS found 
no cases in which possession of exclusive rights was 
necessary for the development of a particular genetic 
test, including test kits and tests for both common 
and rare genetic diseases.24 
This case proves the point.  As the District Court 
Opinion discusses at length, the discovery of the 
BRCA 1/2 gene patents received significant federal 
funding through the National Institutes of Health 
and was made possible by the use of known 
sequencing techniques25 and the scientific 
contributions of various teams of researchers, 
including those who were staunchly opposed to 
patenting the BRCA 1/2 gene sequences.26  
B. Myriad’s Patents Stifle Advances in 
Testing and Research. 
 
Plaintiffs in this suit include researchers at Yale 
University, the University of Pennsylvania, and 
Georgetown University who would like to offer a 
broader range of testing and services to their 

24 SACGHS report at 2. 
ʹͷAss’n for Molecular Pathology et. al v. United States Patent 
and Trademark Office, 653 F.3d 1329, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2011) 
(Circuit Judge Bryson concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) (95a); Ass’n for Molecular Pathology et. al. v. United States 
Patent and Trademark Office, 702 F. Supp.2d 181, 201-202 
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (155a-156a).
26 Stiglitz Decl. ¶ 26, Jan. 19, 2010; Ass’n for Molecular 
Pathology et. al., 702 F. Supp.2d at 201-202 (154a-158a) (citing 
Jeff M. Hall et al., Linkage of Early-Onset Familial Breast 
Cancer to Chromosome 17q21, 250 Science 1684 (1990); Richard 
Wooster, et. al, Identification of the Breast Cancer 
Susceptability Gene BRCA 2, 378 Nature 789-92 (1995)). 
10 
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patients but fear they will be sued for infringement 
by Myriad.27  By threatening litigation and sending 
cease and desist notices, Myriad prevents 
researchers and specialists at top academic 
institutions from researching alternative and less 
costly means of testing for mutations in the BRCA 
1/2 genes.28  In addition, because of its patents, 
Myriad controls all test data in the United States, 
but fails to make this data readily available to 
researchers, limiting their ability to conduct research 
on breast cancer, ovarian cancer, and other cancers 
and diseases.29   
 
a. The Patents Prevent Research To 
Improve Myriad’s Test, Which 
Contains Numerous Ambiguities 
And Fails to Detect Some 
Mutations. 
The best means to ensure the quality of genetic 
tests is to independently verify test results and use 
proficiency testing, a method in which multiple labs 
scrutinize the same sample.30  However, due to its 
active enforcement of its patents, Myriad is the 
exclusive provider of BRCA 1/2 tests for mutations 

27 Myriad aggressively enforces its patent against private 
research labs, nonprofits research institutions, and universities.  
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology et. al., 702 F. Supp.2d at 204-206 
(163a-166a) (including University of Pennsylvania, Cancer 
Genetics Network Project  sponsored by the National Cancer 
Institute, Georgetown University, Yale University, and 
Oncormed); SACGHS report at 33. 
28 Ledbetter Decl. ¶¶ 13, 16, Aug. 20, 2009. 
29 Swisher Decl. ¶¶ 14, 15, 19, Aug. 19, 2009. 
30 SACGHS report at 48. 
11 
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
associated with breast or ovarian cancer in the 
United States.   
Since 2002, the standard test offered by Myriad is 
its Comprehensive BRACAnalysis, which consists of 
the full sequencing of the BRCA 1/2 genes with a 
large rearrangement panel for detecting five common 
large rearrangement mutations.31  In 2006, a study 
on the spectrum of mutations in BRCA genes 
revealed that Myriad’s full sequencing test contains 
serious inaccuracies: 12% of women with negative 
test results carry cancer-predisposing genomic 
deletions or duplications in the BRCA 1/2 genes.32  
The study further revealed significant numbers of 
previously undetected mutations in BRCA 1/2 genes, 
including 22 different genomic rearrangements.33   
It is well-known that the cause of these 
ambiguities lies in the limitations of the sequencing 
test itself.  Simply sequencing the coding region of 
the BRCA 1/2 genes will not reveal all known 
causative mutations that have been associated with 
an increased risk of developing ovarian or breast 
cancer.34  Sequencing only uncovers approximately 
70% of known causative mutations.  Of the 
remaining 30%, a significant portion are structural 

31 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology et. al., 702 F. supp. 2d at 203 
(160a). 
32 Tom Walsh et al., Spectrum of Mutations in BRCA 1, BRCA 
2, CHEK2, and TP53 in Families at High Risk for Breast 
Cancer, 295 J. Am. Med. Ass’n 1379 (2006); Swisher Decl.¶¶ 25-
26, Aug. 19, 2009; Andy Pollack, Flaw Seen In Genetic Test For 
Cancer Risk, N. Y. Times, Mar. 22, 2006, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/22/health/22breast.html. 
33 Walsh et al., Spectrum of Mutations, supra, at 11. 
34 Ledbetter Decl. ¶ 16, Aug. 20, 2009. 
12 
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mutations, which are primarily large 
rearrangements in the gene that disrupt its 
function.35  In order to test for structural mutations, 
an additional method of testing must be used.36  In 
Europe, testing has been done using Multiplex 
Ligation-dependent Probe Amplification (MPLA), an 
alternative test that can identify cancer-predisposing 
genomic deletions and duplications that Myriad’s 
sequencing test does not.37  Despite knowledge of this 
methodology, until 2006, Myriad continued to employ 
a partial testing strategy.  As a result, a significant 
number of women were receiving false negative 
testing results.38  In 2006, Myriad finally began 
offering a supplemental test called the 
BRACAnalysis Rearrangement Test (BART) which 
Myriad claims can detect all large rearrangement 
mutations in the BRCA 1/2 genes.39  To this day, 
however, Myriad does not automatically test for 
structural mutations in the event of a negative 
sequencing test result.40 Moreover, while Myriad 
asserts that BART is the gold standard for structural 
testing, Myriad has not released any formal 
comparison of BART with MLPA.41   
In addition to limiting who gets tested, Myriad 
also fails to engage in proficiency testing or sample 

35 Id. 
36 Walsh et al., Spectrum of Mutations, supra, at 11; Swisher 
Decl. ¶ 27, Aug. 19, 2009. 
37 Swisher Decl. ¶ 24, Aug. 19, 2009. 
38 Ledbetter Decl. ¶ 16, Aug. 20, 2009. 
39 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology et. al., 702 F. supp. 2d at 203 
(160a). 
40 Ledbetter Decl. ¶ 16, Aug. 20, 2009. 
41 Id. at ¶¶ 32-33. 
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exchange programs.42  These programs allow 
multiple researchers to act as a check on each others’ 
work, an important aspect of quality control that is 
“jeopardized when one lab controls all diagnostic 
testing for a disease.”43 In sum, without competition, 
Myriad fails to provide an optimal level of testing 
services, creating serious health risks for individual 
women as well as the public health.   
b. The BRCA 1/2 Gene Patents Place 
Limits on Multiplex and Full 
Human Genome Testing that 
Prevent Researchers From 
Investigating Complex and Life-
Threatening Diseases. 
Myriad’s patents directly interfere with 
researchers’ ability to investigate complex diseases.   
Current understandings of complex diseases reveal 
that in most cases, rather than associating a single 
gene with a given disease, multiple genes play a 
causative role.44  For example, autism is associated 
with more than ten different genes.45  Similarly, 
BRCA 1/2 may be associated with, and serve as a 
predictor for, cancers other than breast or ovarian 
cancer, and even other diseases.46  “Multiplex 
testing” is a recent innovation in genetic testing 
which allows researchers to simultaneously test 
multiple genetic markers.47  Such screening might 
eventually be done by affordable whole-genome 

42 Id. at ¶ 23. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. at ¶ 24. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. at ¶ 25. 
47 SACGHS report at 49. 
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sequencing and may be used in various contexts, 
including newborn screening.48  This testing will be 
essential to identifying conditions that involve 
multiple genetic factors or to simultaneously test for 
multiple conditions.49 
However, the fact that multiplex tests involve 
multiple genes also raises concerns that they will 
violate multiple patents.50  The number of patents 
protecting genes spread among various patent 
holders and assignees, thus far 20% of the human 
genome,51 has led to a “patent thicket,” described by 
the SACGHS report as “a dense web of overlapping 
intellectual property rights that a company must 
hack its way through in order to actually 
commercialize new technology.”52  The SACGHS 
report concludes that because of the thousands of 
patents claiming gene molecules or methods of 
associating a gene with a phenotype, developing 

48 Id. (citing The President’s Council on Bioethics, The changing 
moral focus of newborn screening: an ethical analysis by the 
President’s Council on Bioethics. Chapter Three: The Future of 
Newborn Screening (2008)). 
49 SACGHS report at 49. 
50 Id. (citing D Nicol, Navigating the molecular patent 
landscape, 18 Expert Opinion on Therapeutic Pat. 461, 468 
(2009); S Soini, S Aymé, & G Matthijs, Patenting and licensing 
in genetic testing: ethical, legal and social issues, 16 Eur. J. of 
Human Genetics S10, S12 (2008); TJ Ebersole, MC Guthrie, & 
JA Goldstein, Patent pools as a solution to the licensing 
problems of diagnostic genetics 17 Intellectual Property & 
Technology Law Journal 6 (2005)).   
51 K. Huang & F. Murray, Does Patent Strategy Shape the Long-
Run Supply Of Public Knowledge? Evidence From Human 
Genetics, 52 Acad. of Mgmt. J. 1193 (2006). 
52 SACGHS report at 51 (citing C Shapiro, Navigating the 
patent thicket: cross licenses, patent pools, and standard setting, 
1 Innovation Pol’y and the Econ. 119 (2001)).   
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multiplex testing, parallel sequencing and whole-
genome sequencing will depend upon the acquisition 
of multiple rights or licensees to patents on genes, 
which will likely be prohibitively expensive and 
complex under current law.53   
A recent study performed by researchers from the 
Centre for Intellectual Property Rights and the 
Centre for Human Genetics in Belgium confirms that 
64% of patents relating to genetic testing will be 
difficult to invent around.54  Patents on human genes 
are often also difficult to interpret.  For example, 
claim six of Myriad’s patent on the BRCA 1 gene 
sequence is so broad that it includes at least 4% and 
as much as 100% of the genes in the human 
genome.55  Patent claims that are difficult to 
circumvent can only be evaded after “a substantial 
investment of money and time, as well as a large 
amount of inventiveness.”56  Even if many of those 
patents are ultimately found to be invalid for 
anticipation or obviousness, the costs associated with 
litigating the scope of the patents is prohibitive.57  As 
the SACGHS report discusses, under the standard 
set out in eBay v. MercExchange, L.L.C., a multiplex 
developer faces the risk of an injunction and will not 

53 SACGHS report at 51-52. 
54 Id. at 15-16 (citing I. Huys, N Berthels, G Matthijs, & G Van 
Overwalle, Legal uncertainty in the area of genetic diagnostic 
testing, 27 Nature Biotechnology 903 (2009)). 
55 Mason. Supp. Decl.  ¶¶ 3-6, Jan. 19, 2010. 
56 SACGHS report at 16. 
57 Id. at 51-52 (citing Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Noncompliance, 
Nonenforcement, Nonproblem? Rethinking the Anticommons in 
Biomedical Research, 45 Hou. L. Rev. 1059, 1076-1080 (2008)). 
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learn if that injunction will issue until after lengthy 
and expensive litigation.58  
The Association of Genetic Counselors concur 
that exclusive licenses and patents will “hinder the 
cost-effectiveness of genetic testing, particularly 
when analysis of multiple genes or the entire genome 
is necessary to assess the risk or existences of a 
disease.”59  As multiplex testing and whole-genome 
sequencing become commonplace medical tools, 
thickets of gene patents will discourage the 
development of advanced tests and their application 
to medicine.60  If more than one gene is patented, 
researchers are prevented from developing a 
comprehensive, cost-effective test for the full panel of 
human genes.61  In the case at hand, as long as the 
patents on the BRCA 1/2 genes remain, researchers 
will be unable to include these genes in tests for 
other disease predispositions, including other forms 
of cancer, as well as in tests that simultaneously test 
for multiple genetic conditions.62 
  

58 SACGHS report at 53 (indicating that the lack of clarity 
regarding how ebay will be applied has a chilling effect on 
research) (citing eBay v. MercExchange, L.L.C ., 547 U.S. 388 
(2006)). 
59 National Society of Genetic Counselors, Position Statement on 
Human Gene Patenting (2010). http://www.nsgc.org/Advocacy/ 
PositionStatements/tabid/107/Default.aspx. 
60 SACGHS report at 62. 
61 Ledbetter Decl. ¶ 24, Aug. 20, 2009. 
62 Ledbetter Decl. ¶ 25, Aug. 20, 2009. 
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c. Myriad’s Monopoly Limits Research 
On BRCA 1/2 and Other Diseases. 
Researchers have intentionally avoided research 
on BRCA 1/2 genes despite their belief that they can 
provide more comprehensive and less costly tests 
than the test offered by Myriad.63  The patent thicket 
that researchers currently face heavily directs their 
genetic research, forcing researches to design their 
business models and research around any gene that 
has been patented or exclusively licensed.64 As a 
result, researchers are unable to provide the public 
with improved tests for BRCA 1/265 or a complete 
test for any other disease that BRCA 1/2 may be 
associated with.66     
Additionally, patents on the BRCA 1/2 genes 
place severe limits on data sharing.  Without 
competition, Myriad is slow to make research 
available to other researchers.  Myriad has stopped 
providing data to the Breast Cancer Information 
Core, a catalogue of all mutations and 
polymorphisms in breast cancer susceptibility genes 
whose principle aim is to facilitate the detection and 
characterization of these genes.67  Genetic tests often 
reveal genetic alterations described as “variants of 
unknown significance” that researchers are unable to 

63 Id. at ¶ 16; Ass’n for Molecular Pathology et. al., 702 F. supp. 
2d at 204 (162a) (“A number of researchers, clinicians, and 
molecular pathologists have the personnel, equipment, and 
expertise to sequence and analyze the BRCA 1/2 genes at a 
lower cost than Myriad’s testing.”). 
64 Ledbetter Decl. ¶ 14, Aug. 20, 2009. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. at ¶¶  24-25. 
67 Swisher Decl. ¶¶ 15, 19, Aug. 19, 2009. 
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interpret.  In order to determine whether these 
variants are benign or pathogenic, researchers need 
large datasets, normally pooled from many labs.  By 
hoarding clinical data for the BRCA 1/2 gene, Myriad 
prevents the greater genetic community from 
analyzing that data and making life-saving 
determinations about whether “variants of unknown 
significance” are benign or a predictor for cancer.68 
Given the limitations set out in Madey v. Duke 
University, academic medical centers and companies 
are likely liable for any infringing acts they commit 
in the course of experiments to develop a new genetic 
test.69  This view is supported by Myriad’s aggressive 
threats of litigation, indicating that they too believe 
that any outside testing of the BRCA 1/2 genes 
infringes their patent.  
Finally, studies on the impact of gene patenting 
on scientific progress and commercialization reveal 
that gene patents decrease production of public 
genetic knowledge by 5-17%, a trend that is 
exacerbated when patents are broad in scope, 
privately owned, or closely linked to a cancerous 
disease.70 All three factors are present in this case.  
Myriad’s patents likely had a negative impact on the 
accumulation of public knowledge of the BRCA1 and 
BRCA2 genes by between 5 and 10%.71   These 
results were mirrored in a study performed by Dr. 
Mildred Cho, a National Human Genome funded 

68 Ledbetter Decl. ¶ 20, Aug. 20, 2009; Swisher Decl. ¶ 18, Aug. 
19, 2009. 
69 See SACGHS report at 73 (citing Madey v. Duke University, 
307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Embrex, Inc. v. Service Eng’r. 
Corp., 216 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).  
70 K. Huang & F. Murray, Patent Strategy, supra, at 14. 
71 Murray Decl. ¶ 20, Aug. 20, 2009. 
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survey of all laboratory directors in the United 
States who were likely to be conducting genetic 
tests.72  53% reported that they decided against 
developing a new clinical genetic test because of a 
gene patent or license.73  Two thirds, or 67% of 
respondents, believe that gene patents resulted in a 
decreased ability to perform research.74  Dr. Cho’s 
study also found that 25% of respondents stopped 
performing a clinical genetic test because of a gene 
patent or license.75  65% of labs that responded 
reported that they had been contacted by a patent or 
license holder regarding the laboratory’s potential 
infringement of a patent by performance of a genetic 
test, including of the BRCA 1/2 genes.76  Further, 
another study performed by the American Society of 
Human Genetics reported similar results, finding 
that 46% of respondents felt that patents had 
delayed or limited their research.77  Likewise, a 
studying analyzing the sequencing of the human 
genome by the public Human Genome Project and 
the private firm Celera revealed a 30% reduction in 
subsequent scientific research and product 
development outcomes as a result of Celera’s 
intellectual property.78  This evidence confirms that 

72 Cho Decl.  ¶¶  9-10, Aug. 17, 2009. 
73 Id. 
74 Id.  
75 Id. at. ¶ 11; Cho, MK et. al., Effects of Patents and Licenses 
On The Provision of Clinical Genetic Testing Services, 5 J. of 
Molecular Diagnostics 3 (2003). 
76 Cho Decl.. ¶¶ 12-13, Aug. 17, 2009. 
77 Id. at ¶ 10 (citing Rabino, I., How human geneticists in US 
view commercialization of the Human Genome Project, 29 
Nature Genetics 15 (2002)).  
78 Heidi L. Williams, Intellectual Property Rights and 
Innovation, (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper 
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though patent law is designed to “expand the public 
storehouse of knowledge,”79 gene patents, and 
specifically the BRCA 1/2 patents, discourage 
innovation and research. 
III. This Court Should Grant The Petition To 
Consider Whether The USPTO 
Improperly Granted Patents, Where 
Those Patents Threaten Women’s Lives 
and Interfere With the Exercise of 
Fundamental Rights.  
Breast cancer is the most frequently diagnosed 
cancer worldwide and the second leading cause of 
cancer death for women in the United States.80  For 
women in the U.S. with mutations in the BRCA 1/2 
genes, lifetime risks for breast cancer are as high as 
80% and lifetime risk of ovarian cancer is as high as 
50%.81  Each year, tens of thousands of women get 
the test offered exclusively by Myriad to make 
determinations about their risk for cancer.82   
Lack of access to one’s genetic information 
deprives patients of the ability to improve their 
health and reduce health risks.  First, Myriad’s 
patents on the BRCA 1/2 genes grant Myriad a 
monopoly on testing that directly reduces women’s 
chances of preventing or surviving breast and 

No. 16213, 2010), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/ 
w16213. 
79 SACGHS report at 2. 
80 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology et. al., 702 F. Supp.2d at 200 
(153a). 
81 Walsh et al., Spectrum of Mutations, supra, at 11; Ass’n for 
Molecular Pathology et. al., 653 F.3d at 1339 (18a). 
82 Pollack, Flaw Seen In Genetic Test, supra, at 11. 
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ovarian cancer.  The BRCA 1/2 patents allow Myriad 
to charge an inflated price of $3000 simply for its 
initial sequencing test and an additional fee for its 
BART large rearrangement testing.83  Facilities in 
Canada, who are not bound by U.S. patent law, 
charge one third of Myriad’s fee to test for breast 
cancer.84  Myriad also refuses many forms of medical 
insurance, forcing women to pay out of pocket or 
forgo testing that could be made available at a lower 
cost.85   
Reduced access to testing prevents patients from 
determining the likely efficacy of various cancer 
treatments.86  Particularly in the case of a life 
threatening illness where prophylactic removal of 
reproductive organs is at stake, Myriad’s patent 
poses enormous harms to women’s access to medical 
information about their own bodies. As discussed in 
the amicus brief of the National Women’s Health 
Network, these harms disproportionately impact 
women of color and lower income women. 
Second, no other lab is permitted to perform the 
test, preventing patients from obtained a second 
opinion or review of Myriad’s test results, regardless 
of the recommendation of a patient’s doctor.87   This 
is the case despite publically known ambiguities in 

83 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology et. al., 702 F. supp. 2d at 203 
(160a). 
84 Id. at 203-204 (161a). 
85 Id. at 204 (161a-162a). 
86 Swisher Decl. ¶ 13, Aug. 19, 2009. 
87 Id. at ;Ass’n for Molecular Pathology et. al., 702 F. supp. 2d at 
207 (169a). 
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Myriad’s sequencing test and the 12% failure rate of 
the BRCA analysis.88   
Third, as discussed at length above, Myriad’s 
patents have discouraged research on the BRCA 1/2 
genes. Because Myriad’s patent claims the 
information on the BRCA 1/2 gene sequence itself, 
and not merely one test for the BRCA gene, no other 
researcher is permitted to develop an alternative test 
for the BRCA 1/2 gene or improve upon Myriad’s 
test.  Without competition, Myriad has delayed in 
improving its test, despite well-documented 
deficiencies and the existence of a high false negative 
score,89 and fails to provide data to researchers, 
inhibiting their ability to have the data sets 
necessary to make determinations about “variants of 
unknown significance.”90  Finally, by preventing 
researchers from testing on the BRCA 1/2 genes, 
Myriad delays not only research on breast and 
ovarian cancer, but also progress in identifying other 
cancers and deadly diseases.91 
The patents at issue in this case deny patients 
access to vital health information about their own 
bodies, inhibiting their ability to make informed 
decisions about treatment, including whether to 
engage in prophylactic surgery to remove their 
reproductive organs.  By inhibiting patient access to 
accurate information about their genetic makeup, 
the BRCA 1/2 patents threaten women’s ability to 

88 Swisher Decl. ¶¶ 25-26, Aug. 19, 2009. 
89 Pollack, Flaw Seen In Genetic Test, supra, at 11; Swisher 
Decl. ¶¶ 25-26, Aug. 19, 2009. 
90 Ledbetter Decl. ¶ 20, Aug. 20, 2009; Swisher Decl. ¶ 18, Aug. 
19, 2009. 
91 Ledbetter Decl.  ¶ 23, Aug. 20, 2009. 
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make decisions about their reproductive lives in 
violation of their rights to reproductive autonomy, 
dignity,92 and bodily integrity, grounded in the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s liberty guarantee.93 
The rights to bodily integrity and reproductive 
autonomy are deeply rooted in our nation’s history 
and tradition,94 particularly  in cases such as this 
that “involve the most intimate and personal choices 
a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to 
personal dignity and autonomy.” Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).  Since 
1891, this Court has recognized the right to bodily 
integrity, stating “[n]o right is held more sacred, or is 
more carefully guarded by the common law, than the 
right of every individual to the possession and 
control of his own person, free from all restraint or 
interference of others....” Union Pacific R. Co. v. 
Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891).  This right to 
decisional autonomy protects a person’s right “to 
determine what shall be done with his own body.”  
Cruzan by Cruzan v. Director, Mississippi Dept. of 
Health, 497 U.S. 261, 269 (1990) (citations omitted).  
In the area of reproductive rights, this Court has 
held that “personal decisions that profoundly affect 
bodily integrity, identity, and destiny should be 

ͻʹReva B. Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of Protection: 
Abortions Restrictions Under Casey/Carhart, 117 Yale L. J. 
1694 (2008). The BRCA 1/2 genes are also associated with 
breast cancer and prostate cancer in men.
93 There is also a First Amendment right at stake in this case, 
which will be addressed on remand should this Court deny cert.  
See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology et. al., 702 F. supp. 2d at 237-
238; Pl.’s Mem.Supp. Summ. J. 32. 
94 See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997). 
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largely beyond the reach of government,” and “are 
central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment.” Casey, 505 U.S. at 851 & 927.  The 
liberty interest in procreation is likewise firmly 
established. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 
(1942) (recognizing a fundamental right to procreate 
and refusing to allow forced sterilization procedures). 
Strict scrutiny applies to any law infringing the 
fundamental right to procreate.95 As this Court 
explained in Washington v. Glucksberg: 
the Fourteenth Amendment “forbids the 
government to infringe ... ‘fundamental’ 
liberty interests at all, no matter what 
process is provided, unless the 
infringement is narrowly tailored to serve 
a compelling state interest.” 
521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997).  In this case, there is no 
compelling interest supporting the government grant 
of patent rights in the BRCA 1/2 genes and the 
infringement of patients’ constitutional rights to 
decisional autonomy and bodily integrity.96  Indeed, 
the compelling interests in public health and in 
promoting medical progress support patent denial. 
Both individual autonomy interests and the public 
health would be served, indeed vitally protected, by 

95Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942); see also 
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-586 (1965); 
Eisenstandt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972); Carey v. 
Populations Services, 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977). 
ͻ͸This right has only been curtailed in a narrow set of cases 
grounded in the government’s interest in preserving lives and 
the public health. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 26 
(1905); see also Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 592 & 603 (1977).
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recognizing the inherent invalidity of patenting the 
information within a human gene. 
Myriad’s intrusion into the intimate and private 
decisions of individual citizens should not be 
permitted in the name of a monopoly.  Limiting a 
woman’s ability to access the genetic information 
within her own body serves only to inhibit her 
chances of survival and the survival of countless 
others whose constitutional liberties and lives could 
be spared by overturning the USTPO’s improper 
grant of patents on the BRCA 1/2 genes. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, amici respectfully 
request that the Court grant the Petition for 
Certiorari in the present case. 
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